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Comparative Reflections on Duncan v.
Louisiana and Baldwin v. New York
WILLIAM PIZZI*
In 1968, the Supreme Court handed down one of the most famous
cases of the Warren Court era, Duncan v. Louisiana,1 which extended
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial to the states. Writing for the
majority, Justice White declared that "trial by jury in criminal cases is
fundamental to the American scheme of justice"2 and, thus, Louisiana
had violated the Constitution in trying Duncan without a jury for simple
battery, which was then punishable by up to two years in prison.'
While the Court in Duncan made it clear that there was a category
of minor crimes, "petty" offenses that could be tried without a jury
without infringing the Sixth Amendment.4 The Court refused to draw
the line between petty offenses and serious crimes in Duncan because it
felt that a crime threatening a sentence of two years in prison clearly fell
within the category of crimes requiring a jury trial.5
Given the enormous volume of cases that flow through lower
courts with jurisdiction over misdemeanors and petty offenses, the
Court was soon pressed to draw the precise jury trial line. Two years
after Duncan, in Baldwin v. New York, the Court announced more clear-
ly the sweep of the Sixth Amendment when it reversed a misdemeanor
conviction punishable by up to one year because no jury had been pro-
vided.6 The Court in Baldwin explained that "no offense can be deemed
'petty' for purposes of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for
* Emeritus Professor, University of Colorado Law School.
I. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
2. Id. at 149.
3. Id. at 161-162.
4. Id. at 159.
5. Id. at 161.
6. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1970).
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more than six months is authorized."7
This Article takes another look at the line drawn in Duncan and
Baldwin to ask whether the sweeping extension of the right to jury trial
even to minor felonies and misdemeanors might have been a mistake in
retrospect and whether we ought to think about going in a different di-
rection today.
This may seem disrespectful, especially to Duncan, which is an
iconic decision not just for criminal procedure but also because of the
civil rights implications. However, as we have known since the time of
John Locke in 1691, well-intentioned government actions can backfire
with the result being the opposite of what was intended. 8 At that time,
the English economy was stagnant, so a bill was put forward in Parlia-
ment that would have lowered the permissible interest rate that could be
charged on loans from the market rate of 6% to a maximum rate of 4%.'
The theory was that lowering the cost of borrowing would stimulate the
economy by making more loans available to those who wished, for ex-
ample, to buy property and expand their businesses.10 The legal philos-
opher, John Locke, argued, however, that it would have the opposite ef-
fect: those with money would find other investments or they would find
ways around the law to get their 6% and those schemes would make
things worse for borrowers, not better. 1
Locke's warning issued more than 300 years ago was an early in-
stance of what economists call "the law of unintended consequences,"
meaning that any government action may have consequences that over-
whelm or even undercut the benefits that the action was intended to
achieve."2 Our trial system and the requirement of juries for all misde-
meanors and felonies is an instance of this "law." We have fewer crim-
inal trials taking place today in our courts, not more, and the pressure
that is being put on defendants to plead guilty and waive their right to
trial is enormous. If the right to a jury trial was intended to protect de-
fendants from the tyrannical power of the state, there are reasons for
thinking it has failed its task.
This Article will look at the Duncan and Baldwin line compara-
tively by examining the trial models in two other common law coun-
7. Id. at 69.
8. See ROGER WOOLHOUSE, LOCKE: A BIOGRAPHY, 290 (2007).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 290-291.
11. Id. at 290.
12. Morgen Witzel, From The Editor, CORPORATE FINANCE REVIEW, 2014 1, (Jan/Feb.
2014).
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tries, England and Canada. Each of these countries has two criminal
courts, one that handles full jury trials but also another court that can try
misdemeanors and less serious felonies without a jury. 3 The essay in-
tends to show that the two trial models are built in such a way that it is
almost always advantageous to the prosecution and the defense to have
the case tried in the court that hears cases without a jury. With two trial
models and the bulk of criminal cases being tried without a jury, the sort
of plea bargaining pressures one sees routinely put on defendants in the
United States is not necessary and generally is not available or permit-
ted in England and Canada.
This Article has three sections with Section I discussing briefly
Duncan and Baldwin and offering a critique of those opinions. It will
also show just how few criminal trials take place today and how much
pressure prosecutors are able to put on defendants to convince them to
waive all their trial rights and plead guilty. These pressures often in-
volve a threat of punishment much greater than anyone in the courtroom
would deem appropriate for the crime in question.
Next, Section II will turn to the English criminal justice system
and explain the differences between the two trial courts for criminal
cases: magistrates' courts and Crown Courts. It will show that most
criminal trials in that country will take place in magistrates' courts
where there are no juries. Having a more efficient and less expensive
trial procedure for the vast majority of cases, plea bargaining is more
limited in England where defendants receive a fixed discount from the
sentences they would otherwise receive after trial in exchange for plead-
ing guilty.
Then, Section III will turn to Canada and show that, like England,
most criminal trials, even for felonies, will take place in provincial
courts where there are no juries rather than in superior courts where jury
trials take place. As in England, the charging pressure is strongly re-
duced because both prosecutors and defendants benefiting if a case can
be tried in provincial court.
Finally, the Article will conclude with some thoughts on options
for reform if we truly want more defendants to have an opportunity to
contest the charges against them.
13. Criminal Courts, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/courts/magistrates-courts (last updated
Aug. 12, 2015).
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I. DUNCAN AND BALDWIN
A. Duncan v. Louisiana
The story of Duncan v. Louisiana14 is a tribute to the courage of
Duncan and his family, who chose to fight instead of plead, as well as
the courage of his lawyers who went into a staunchly segregationist par-
ish located fifty miles south of New Orleans to fight for Duncan.5 Gary
Duncan was a nineteen-year-old black man in Plaquemines Parish when
criminal charges were filed against him in retaliation because his two
twelve-year-old cousins had dared to attend a school previously re-
served for white students only.16 The two boys had been assaulted,
threatened, and harassed at their new school.17  The battery charge
stemmed from an incident in which Duncan and his two cousins were
involved in a confrontation with four white teenage boys. 8 Duncan had
stopped his car and was trying to defuse the situation by getting his
cousins into his car and away from the white teenagers." In the process,
Duncan "touched" or "slapped" (depending on whose account one be-
lieved) one of the white teenagers on the elbow leading to the battery
charge.0
Worried that no local attorney would be willing to defend him,
Duncan's family turned to the Lawyers Constitutional Defense Commit-
tee, which litigated civil rights cases in Mississippi, Alabama, and Loui-
siana.2' Richard Sobol, a lawyer on leave from a Washington, D.C. law
firm, and Robert F. Collins, later to become the first African-American
U.S. District Judge, agreed to take the case.22
At trial, Duncan's lawyers demanded a jury trial based on the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendment, which was denied and the trial went ahead
in front of the local judge, who was a pawn of the political machine.
Despite sharply differing accounts of what had happened between the
black and white witnesses, the judge found Duncan guilty of simple bat-
14. See Nancy J. King, Duncan v. Louisiana: How Bigotry in the Bayou Led to the Federal
Regulation of Juries, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 261 (Carol Streiker, ed., 2006). This
story is beautifully recounted by Nancy King, in a chapter of a book devoted to detailing the
background of famous Supreme Court cases of the criminal procedure revolution.
15. Id. at 266-68.
16. Id. at 265.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 265-66.
20. Id. at 266.
21. Id. at 265.
22. Id. at 267-68.
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tery and sentenced him to 60 days, a harsh sentence for simple battery.23
Much of Justice White's opinion for the majority in Duncan deals
with the centrality of jury trial in English legal history. Justice White
explained that "by the time our Constitution was written, jury trial in
criminal cases had been in existence in England for several centuries
and carried impressive credentials traced by many to Magna Carta.' z
Jury trials, he went on to note, "came to America with English colonists,
and received strong support from them" such that infringement of that
right was one of colonists' complaints against the Crown.25
Against this historical support for jury trials, the opinion noted the
strong support for jury trial not just in the federal constitution but in
state constitutions as well.
The laws of every State guarantee a right to jury trial in
serious criminal cases; no State has dispensed with it; nor are
there significant movements underway to do so. Indeed, the
three most recent state constitutional revisions, in Maryland,
Michigan, and New York, carefully preserved the right of the
accused to have the judgment of a jury when tried for a serious
crime.26
The guarantee of a jury trial, the opinion continued, was intended
to provide an accused with "an inestimable safeguard against the cor-
rupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or ec-
centric judge."27
The real issue in the case was, of course, whether simple battery
was a sufficiently serious crime to require a trial by jury. Here the
Court noted that in 49 of the 50 states, nonjury trials are permitted only
for crimes punishable by a year or less.28 While agreeing that some
crimes are sufficiently minor or "petty" to be triable without a jury, the
Court left the drawing of the exact line open because the Court conclud-
ed that a crime punishable by up to two years, as was simple battery in
Louisiana, clearly fell within the category of crimes requiring trial by
jury.
29
The aftermath of Duncan is a sobering reminder about the limits of
trial by jury as a protection against "overzealous" prosecutors and
23. Id. at 269.
24. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 151.
25. Id. at 152.
26. Id. at 154.
27. Id. at 156.
28. Id. at 161.
29. Id. at 161-62.
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"compliant" and "biased" judges.3° After Duncan came down, Louisi-
ana quickly amended its simple battery statute to make the crime pun-
ishable by no more than six months imprisonment and the state prepared
to prosecute Duncan again.31 One suspects he would have ended up
with the same result: 60 days in jail. The prosecution was only halted
when a federal court permanently enjoined the prosecution of Duncan
on the ground that the case never would have been prosecuted or re-
prosecuted but for the civil rights context out of which the case arose
and the desire to punish Duncan for his exercise of constitutional
rights.32 The federal injunction helped Duncan avoid conviction, but for
other black defendants charged in the following years in Plaquemines
Parish with simple battery, Duncan would not apply. "
As for defendants charged with minor felonies in the years after
Duncan, a jury trial may prevent injustice, but a compliant and biased
judge can influence a trial outcome even with a jury. And for those de-
fendants who are convicted by a jury, the biased and compliant judge
will impose sentence; a decision typically unreviewable in most Ameri-
can jurisdictions.34 In short, Duncan was a very imperfect protection
against a biased and compliant judge.
B. Baldwin v. New York
Having come down very strongly in Duncan in favor of jury trials
as an essential part of due process but refusing to draw the line indicat-
ing which crimes required jury trial, the Court was then asked, in Bald-
win v. New York, to draw that line. New York City did not provide jury
trials to defendants charged with misdemeanors (crimes punishable by
up to a year in jail) and Robert Baldwin, who was charged with "jos-
tling" - a pickpocketing offense - was convicted without a jury and sen-
tenced to a year in prison."
The plurality opinion, again by Justice White, emphasized that
New York City was very much an outlier in denying jury trials to those
30. Id. at 165.
31. King, supra note 14, at 289.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 288-90.
34. A major treatise on sentencing in the United States, ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF
SENTENCING § 14:4 (3d ed. 2004), bluntly explains the limited nature of appellate review of sen-
tences: Despite significant sentencing reform in the late 20th Century, the dominant principle of
appellate sentence review remains unchanged: Unless trial court discretion was abused, sentences
within constitutional and statutory boundaries are not reviewable.
35. Baldwin. 399 U.S. at 67.
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charged with misdemeanors.3 6 Justice White noted that since Duncan,
the other two states, Louisiana and New Jersey, that allowed convic-
tions for misdemeanors without jury trial - had fallen in line with other
states and now required jury trials for such offenses.37 Even in the state
of New York, jurisdictions outside New York City provided jury trials
in misdemeanor cases.38 Against this background, White concluded that
"this near-uniform judgment of the Nation" required that the line for re-
quiring jury trials be extended to offenses carrying a possible sentence
of more than six months.39
White's opinion is a bit unfair to New York City. In the first
place, New York City was definitely not Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana.
The district attorney's office for New York County in the late 1960s had
long been considered one of the finest prosecutorial offices in the coun-
try.40 The Legal Aid Society in the city, one of the oldest legal institu-
tions representing indigent clients in the country,4' was equally respect-
ed for the quality of its work in both civil and criminal cases. Second,
the New York City Bar Association had a long history of taking aggres-
sive positions in reports, studies, and amicus briefs against injustice, not
just locally but nationally and even internationally.
42
New York City was made to seem grudging and unfair for not fol-
lowing the rest of the state and other big cities in granting jury trials in
misdemeanor cases, but New York City is in a very different situation
from other cities in New York, and may well be in a very different posi-
tion from cities like Chicago or Los Angeles. To understand the special
nature of criminal courts in New York City, one only has to reflect on
the fact that the New York City Criminal Court which handles misde-
meanors had, at the time of Baldwin, a case load docket that was 39
times greater than that of Buffalo, New York's second largest city.
43
The Court was clearly in a hurry to draw a line and, in the process,
36. Id. at 71-72.
37. Id. at 71.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 72.
40. See Chip Brown, Cyrus Vance, Jr. 's 'Moneyball'Approach to Crime, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec.
3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/magazine/cyrus-vance-jrs-moneyball-approach-to-
crime.html (noting that Frank Hogan, the District Attorney in New York City for more than 30
years, was known as "Mr. Integrity")
41. The Legal Aid Society traces its roots back to 1876. See The History of the Legal Aid
Society, THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, http://www.legal-aid.org/en/las/aboutus/ourhistory.aspx
42. On the history of the New York City Bar Association, see generally About the New York
City Bar Association, NEW YORK CITY BAR, http://www.nycbar.org/about-us/overview-about-us.
43. Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 135 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
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to force New York City to do what other American cities apparently did
and extend the right to a jury trial to misdemeanor defendants. One
would have liked to have seen the Court examine the misdemeanor
caseloads in other large cities, the number of trials in each city, and the
plea bargaining rate to see if those cities were providing anywhere near
the number of misdemeanor trials that New York City provided. It
might have been the case that New York City gave many more defend-
ants a chance to put on a defense at trial, whereas other cities offered ju-
ry trials in theory but not nearly the percentage in practice as New York
City.
Another distinction between New York City and other large cities
was the right of misdemeanor defendants in New York City to ask for a
trial in front of a panel of three judges. Justice Harlan noted in dissent
that the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, TRIAL BY JURY had suggested this might be a possible com-
promise where jury trials are not permitted or are waived.44
In many western countries with strong legal systems, a panel of
judges is commonplace at criminal trials. But the Court tossed this pro-
tection aside quickly stating only that it is necessary to interpose "be-
tween the accused and his accuser of the common-sense judgment of a
group of laymen[.. .who... .are less likely to function or appear to func-
tion as but another arm of the Government that has proceeded against
him]." 45 But Justice Harlan's dissent cites to a speech by the President
of the Legal Aid Society in New York stating that "49% of the society's
clients who were tried in the New York Criminal Court in 1967 (with-
out a jury) were acquitted[.]",46 This would seem to suggest that the
judges in hearing misdemeanor cases were not acting as "an arm of the
Government." Of course, also not discussed in the Court's opinion was
the issue of resources. It was estimated at the time of the Baldwin deci-
sion that a judge in New York's criminal courts could handle two jury
trials a week, but could handle between fifteen and twenty-five nonjury
trials.47 Did the Court really expect that there would be an increase in
misdemeanor trials in the years after Baldwin? And did the Court con-
sider that charging might be affected once there was no advantage to a
44. Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 136.
45. Id. at 126.
46. Id.at136,n.16.
47. Jury Trials for Misdemeanants: The Effects of Baldwin, 7 COLUM. J. L. AND SOC.
PROBS, 173, 183 (1971) (testimony of Judge John H. Ryan, President of the Association of Judg-
es of the Criminal Court of the City of New York).
[Vol. 38:91
Reflections on Duncan v. LA & Baldwin v. NY
prosecutor in keeping a case at the misdeibeanor level?
The next subsection will suggest that defendants pay a hefty price
for a trial system that is locked into the jury trial model for all misde-
meanors and felonies.
C. Duncan and Baldwin in Retrospect
In 2004, the ABA Section on Litigation put together a research
project entitled, of course, The Vanishing Trial, which studied the phe-
nomenon from many different angles.48 More than 400 pages of articles
were published in the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies.49  What is
shocking about the data is that not only has there been a startling de-
crease in the percentage of cases that go to trial, but in many jurisdic-
tions a decrease in the absolute number of trials shows that more trials
took place in courtrooms in the 1960s and 1970s than take place in
courtrooms today.50
The Court in Duncan paid homage to the long history of jury trials,
but the jury trials that took place at common law - where the same jury
heard multiple cases over just a couple of days5 - are not the jury trials
that took place in the 1960s and the jury trials of the 1960s are not the
jury trials of today.52 For example, a study in 1984 in New York found
that jury selection in that state was then averaging 12.7 hours of trial
time and consumed 40% of the trial itself.
53
At some point, when a trial model is too complicated and too ex-
pensive, the system will find ways to work around trials and that is what
is happening. The federal system, once a model for the states in the
way things should be done, is a sad example of the decline in trials.
Though the number of judges has doubled since 1962, the absolute
48. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. OF EMPIR. LEG. STUD. 459, 459-60 (2004).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 459.
51. See John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the
Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 115 (1983). John Langbein describes a session at Old Bai-
ley in October 1754 where a judge presided over sixteen trials with two juries in three days and
other judges tried thirty-three other cases with the same two juries during the same sessions. He
states that such case dispositions'were common at the time.
52. Evidence law has been heavily constitutionalized, see, e.g., Bullcoming v. New Mexico,
131 S.Ct. 2705 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), as has been jury
selection, see, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
53. See Marcia Chambers, Issue and Debate; Who Should Pick Jurors, Attorneys or the
Judge?, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 1983) http://www.nytimes.com/1983/06/13/nyregion/issue-and-
debate-who-should-pick-jurors-attomeys-or-the-judge.html.
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number of criminal trials declined 30% between 1962 and 2002. . This
is a trial system with talented prosecutors and defense attorneys, and
excellent judges. it also is supported with tremendous resources. It
could afford many more trials than take place today,55 but its courtrooms
are usually dark.
Of course, state systems have many more criminal cases to worry
about - lots of burglaries, assaults, rapes, thefts, and other common
crimes that the federal system does not need to concern itself with. It
could not possibly provide full jury trials on the federal model for even
a quarter of these cases, so plea bargaining is king. While plea bargain-
ing has a long history in the United States, especially for high volume
crimes, today everything is plea bargained.56 In 1974, 80% of our con-
victions came from plea bargaining;7 now the percentage is much high-
er - close to 96 or 97%.58 It has been reported that the plea bargaining
rate in Arizona is 99.3%.59
To make plea bargaining work most effectively, defendants need
to be threatened with considerably higher sentences, and we have seen
states follow exactly that pattern - sentences for all crimes have risen.6 °
Longer sentences enable the criminal justice system to run with brutal
efficiency.61 There are very few trials because defendants cannot risk
trials. In turn, this means that many more defendants can be processed
through the system.
Two cases show dramatically how the system works today. The
61first is a well-known Supreme Court case, Bordenkircher v. Hayes. In
that case the prosecutor offered to recommend a five-year sentence if
Hayes pled guilty to uttering a forged instrument in the amount of
$88.30, but threatened to indict him as a habitual criminal if he refused
54. Galanter, supra, note 48 at 493, 500.
55. Professor Ronald Wright crunches the numbers on cases in federal courts per district
judge and finds that the caseload rise over the last few decades was modest and not sufficient to
explain the sharp rise in the guilty plea rate. See generally Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion
and the End ofInnocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 79, 117 21 (2005).
56. Id. at 84, 154.
57. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 299 (2011).
58. Galanter, supra note 48, at 512.
59. See Tom Gleeson, The Case of the Vanishing Jury, CRIM. L. & JUST. WEEKLY (June 12,
2009), http://www.criminallawandjustice.co.uk/features/Case-Vanishing-Jury.
60. Our murder rate has declined over the last two decades and we have a lower rate of bur-
glaries and robberies than many other countries, including England and Canada, but we punish all
crimes more severely. See Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations', N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/us/23prison.html?_r-l&fta=y.
61. Galanter, supra note 48, at 494-95.
62. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
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to "save the court the inconvenience and necessity of a trial., 63 Hayes
refused the offer, the prosecutor brought the habitual offender count,
and Hayes received a life sentence.64
This happens all the time in our criminal justice system where
mandatory sentences are used as weapons to force plea bargains,65 but
what was interesting in Hayes was the naked admission of the prosecu-
tor that a five-year sentence would have been appropriate for the crime
and the offender, but he would receive a sentence one suspects three or
four times greater if he refused to "save the court the inconvenience and
necessity of a trial. 66
The Court upheld this sentence, reasoning that this was simply
plea bargaining. This was at least an honest opinion because trial penal-
ties of 300% or 400% are not unusual in the United States.67 It has been
reported that, on average, sentences after trial are close to 300% more
68severe than after a plea bargain.
The second case that shows the brutal power the prosecution holds
over defendants is a 2013 district court case, United States v. Kupa.9 In
that case, the defendant, Lulzim Kupa, who had two prior felony con-
victions for conspiring to distribute marijuana, was charged, along with
other defendants, with distributing more than five kilograms of cocaine.
The offense with this amount stipulated as an element carried a manda-
tory minimum sentence of 10 years in prison and a maximum of life in
prison, often referred to as a "10-life count" in the vernacular of federal
drug laws.70
The government offered Kupa the following plea agreement: if
Kupa pled guilty to distributing cocaine, the government would with-
draw the count charging the amount that would trigger the 10-life sen-
tence and recommend a sentence of 110-137 months in prison, which
would allow Kupa to be released after serving seven years and ten
months in prison.7 ' But it told Kupa that if he did not accept the plea, as
a result of his prior criminal history, it would file against him what is
63. Id. at 358.
64. Id. at 358-59.
65. Gleeson, supra note 59.
66. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 360.
67. See Candace McCoy, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Hammer: The Trial Penalty in in
USA 23, 27 in THE JURY TRIAL IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Douglas D. Koski, ed. 2003).
68. Id.
69. United States v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 417 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
70. Id. at 432.
71. Id.
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known as "a prior felony information," as set out in 21 U.S.C. § 851,
and he would then get a mandatory life sentence without the possibility
of parole.72 Kupa was given a day to accept the plea offer.
When Kupa did not accept the offer, the government duly filed the
§ 851 information, which mandated life in prison upon conviction.74
However, it gave Kupa another chance to plead guilty; if Kupa pled
guilty, the government would withdraw the § 851 information and rec-
ommend a sentence in the range of 130-162 months.75 • Thus, for not ac-
cepting the early plea agreement, Kupa now was being offered a sen-
tence that would allow his release in nine years and four months. He
was again given a day to think it over.76
When he did not accept the plea agreement quickly enough, the
government forwarded another proposed agreement, this time ratcheting
up the Guidelines range (taking away a discount for "acceptance of re-
sponsibility") so that Kupa would now serve ten years in prison if he
pled as opposed to a mandatory life sentence if he were convicted at tri-
al. 77 Kupa finally agreed to the proposal and told the sentencing judge
he wanted to plead guilty, ... before things got worse.78
Many cases like Kupa's go under the radar because they are hid-
den behind a guilty plea. The reason we know so much about Kupa's
plea of guilty is that the judge who accepted Kupa's guilty plea, Judge
John Gleeson, a former prosecutor of some note,79 wrote a scathing six-
ty-page opinion describing how the threat of a §851 prior felony infor-
mation was used in this case and how it is used in "countless others" to
coerce guilty pleas from defendants.80 For those defendants who insist
on exercising their right o trial, "prosecutors insist on the imposition of






75. Id. at 432-33
76. Id. at 433.
77. Id. at 433-34.
78. Id. at 434.
79. Judge Gleeson was at one time Chief of Special Prosecutions in the U.S. Attorney's Of-
fice for the Eastern District of New York and he was the lead prosecutor in the prosecution of
John Gotti, the head of the notorious Gambino crime family. His background is set out at: Hon.
John Gleeson, PLI, http://www.pli.edu/Content/Faculty/HonJohnGleeson/_/N-
4oZlzl3fmr?ID=PE464699 (last visited Sept. 2, 2015).
80. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 419.
81. Id.at420.
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In his opinion, Judge Gleeson describes the threatened use of prior
felony information as the sentencing equivalent of "a two-by-four to the
forehead.8 2  Judge Gleeson went on to say that the government's
threatened use of prior felony information "coerces guilty pleas and
produces sentences so excessively severe they take your breath away."83
Plea bargaining has been around a long time in the United States,
but plea bargaining was usually conceived of as offering defendants
discounts from the sentences they otherwise deserve after conviction.
8 4
What is different today is the prosecutor's ability to threaten and deliver
punishments after a trial that no one considers appropriate for what the
defendant did.85
Harsh sentences are one way in which the government "persuades"
defendants to waive all of their trial rights, including the right to a jury.
But there are other ways such as the drafting of statutes that do not per-
mit a defense.
The Wall Street Journal had a series of front page articles in 2011
and 2012 showing the dramatic increase in federal crimes over the last
few decades and it showed how these laws are being used to convict
people who are not deserving of a criminal conviction.8 6 The theme of
these articles, one of which was entitled As Criminal Laws Proliferate,
More Are Ensnared, was that the number of federal crimes has prolifer-
ated over the last few decades and many people are being prosecuted
and convicted for acts under laws of which they were unaware and
which they never intended to violate.87
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Wright, supra note 55, at 108-110.
85. Idat 112.
86. See Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Criminal Laws Proliferate, More Are En-
snared, WALL ST. J. (July 23, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/news/aricles/SB 10001424052748703749504576172714184601654.; Gary
Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Many Failed Efforts to Count Nation's Federal Criminal Laws,
WALL ST. J. (July 23, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424052702304319804576389601079728920.; Gary
Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Federal Guilty Pleas Soar As Bargains Trump Trials, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 23, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10000872396390443589304577637610097206808.; Gary
Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Federal Crime List Grows, Threshold of Guilt Declines, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 27, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424053111904060604576570801651620000.; Gary
Fields & John R. Emshwiller, A Sewage Blunder Earns Engineer a Criminal Record, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 12, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424052970204903804577082770135339442.
87. See Fields & Emshwiller, As Criminal Laws Proliferate, More Are Ensnared, supra note
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These cases are often hidden behind plea bargains because a high
percentage of the crimes passed by Congress over the law few decades
(or put in place under federal regulations) are strict liability crimes or
permit conviction upon proof of a low level of criminal intent. Hence,
another of the articles in the series was entitled, As Federal Crime List
Grows, Threshold of Guilt Declines.8
One of the articles dealt with the predicament faced by a senior
employee of a military retirement home in the District of Columbia
who, with other staff, diverted a backed up sewage line from the retire-
ment home to an outside storm drain which they believed to be connect-
ed to the city's sewage treatment plant. Instead it drained into a creek
and then into the Potomac.89 (Thirty percent of the city's storm drains
run to the city's sewage treatment plant.90) Though even the Justice De-
partment acknowledged the employee did not realize the waste was go-
ing into a creek and though the employee's supervisor explained it had
been standard practice to divert overflow to the storm drain as the em-
ployee had done, the government prosecuted the employee for violating
the federal Clean Water Act.9'
This is a classic case that should go to trial. Trial judges say that
most criminal trials are not "whodunits" with defendants claiming no
involvement, but rather they are about the moral guilt of the offender.
9 2
In this case, the defendant thought he was doing the right thing to han-
dle the situation and followed what had been the past practice for a sew-
age line blockage. He would have had testimony from his supervisor to
this effect and the jury would have seen that he was a good employee
who never intended to violate the law. But he never would have had a
chance to offer an excuse or explanation at trial because the statute had
no mens rea element.93
Again, one may respond that this has little to do with Duncan and
Baldwin. But when you have a trial system where it will usually take a
week for even the simplest trial, it makes sense that government agen-
88. See Fields & Emshwiller, As Federal Crime List Grows, Threshold of Guilt Declines,
supra note 86.




92. See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, The Myth of Factual Innocence, 82 CHIC.-KENT. L. REV.
663, 676-77 (2007).
93. See Fields and Emshwiller, A Sewage Blunder Earns Engineer a Criminal Record, supra
note 86.
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cies are likely to propose legislation that helps them conserve their re-
sources by avoiding trials.
Finally, note has to be taken of the high incarceration rate in the
United States, as well as the growing percentage of our citizens who
have criminal records, foreclosing many employment opportunities.
94
Our incarceration rate has been the subject of many articles in the
popular press. For example, The Economist ran a story in 2010 on the
topic featuring a dramatic cover illustration of Lady Liberty herself
peering out balefully from behind the bars of a prison cell. 9' The article
intoned that "[n]o other rich country is nearly as punitive as the Land of
the Free" and as proof of that fact it noted that the United States incar-
ceration rate is five times greater than Britain's, nine times greater than
Germany's and twelve times greater than in Japan' s.6
Less well-known is the statistic showing the growing percentage of
citizens with criminal records. Between the early 1990s and 2012, that
percentage increased from roughly 18% to 32%.9' One of the reasons
for this surge in convictions, despite a falling crime rate, is the fact that
misdemeanor courts have become mills that churn out convictions by
the hundreds each day as judges dispose quickly of case after case in a
few minutes through guilty pleas.9s
Our brutal incarceration rate and the alarming rate at which our cit-
izens are marked with criminal records are not caused by Duncan and
Baldwin. But there can be no doubt that those cases have contributed to
the problem. A trial system with only one model, and that one a very
expensive one, gives legislatures no incentive to not raise sentences. It
also gives prosecutors every incentive to go after the low hanging fruit -
those who are poor and less sophisticated - rather than reach for those
far more deserving of prosecution but better able to exploit the system's
many complexities.99




97. See John R. Emshwiller and Gary Fields, Justice Dispensed in Minutes As Petty Crimes
Clog Courts, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 1, 2014) http://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-is-swift-as-petty-
crimes-clog-courts- 1417404782?KEYWORDS=justice+dispensed+in+minutes.
98. Id.
99. In a recent book, THE DIVIDE: AMERICAN INJUSTICE IN THE AGE OF THE WEALTH GAP
(2014), Matt Taibbi contrasts the viciousness with which street crime is prosecuted while wealthy
defendants who cause far more financial harm are not prosecuted and get away with their crimes.
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II. MAGISTRATES' COURTS AND CROWN COURTS 1N ENGLAND
In Duncan, the Supreme Court traced jury trials back to the Magna
Carta and quoted Blackstone for the proposition that a defendant's crim-
inal conviction must be by "the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his
equals and neighbours, indifferently chosen and superior to all suspi-
cion."' ° But while jury trials have a long history in England going back
to early common law, the Court was overlooking the fact that England
has long had two criminal courts, only one of which hears jury trials.
The two trial courts in England are magistrates' court and Crown
Court.' ' Crown Court is the one Americans are likely to know from tel-
evision and movies because it is quite dramatic with judges and barris-
ters wearing white wigs, dickey collars, and robes appropriate to their
position and seniority. It is a setting that is quite theatrical.
Criminal trials in Crown Court are always jury trials and all the
most serious criminal cases - murders, rapes, etc. - will end up in
Crown Court.'°2 But only 3% of criminal cases end up in Crown
Court.'0 3 The real workhorse of the English criminal justice system is
the system of magistrates' courts where all criminal cases are initially
filed and most are resolved by plea bargaining, dismissal of charges, or
trial.
There are two types of judges hearing trials in magistrates' courts,
lay magistrates and district judges. "° Lay magistrates are citizens with-
out formal legal training who go through an appointment process and
eventually are appointed by the Lord Chancellor.'0 5 The lay magistrates
receive no pay (other than expenses) and will often have other employ-
ment, but they must be available to sit as a magistrate for at least twen-
ty-six half-day sessions a year. 'o6 They sit in panels of three and are as-
sisted on points of law by a solicitor or barrister.'0 7
There are approximately 26,000 lay magistrates in England and
Wales and they have been called the backbone of the English criminal
100. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 151-52.
101. See Criminal Courts, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/courts (last visited Feb. 20, 2016)
102. Id.
103. See Tyler Marshall, Lay Magistrates Rule in 97% of English, Welsh Criminal Cases, LA
TIMES, (Dec. 20, 1985), http://articles.latimes.con/1985-12-20/news/mn-50081 -criminal-cases.
104. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Courts, Justice, and Politics, in England in COURTS, LAW, AND
POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 81, 103 (Herbert Jacob et al. eds., 1996).
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justice system.'" One way to think of lay magistrates is to picture them
as analogous to citizens appointed to a planning board or a school board
in a small American city. They are respected members of the communi-
ty with the desire and the time to serve the community in which they
live. They are appointed for a two-year term, but may be reappointed.
District judges sit in magistrates' courts in the larger cities in Eng-
land where the volume of cases is very high.'0 9 District judges are
trained in the law, work full time in magistrates' courts, and are paid
(hence their former title as "stipendiary magistrates" to distinguish them
from lay magistrates). They are comparable to judges in misdemeanor
courts in the United States in that they sit alone in hearing cases. Often,
in large cities, both lay magistrates and istrict court judges hear cases,
but district judges tend to work more quickly because of their experi-
ence and training.
Minor criminal cases - petty offenses and misdemeanors - will
always be heard in magistrates' courts. But what is interesting from a
comparative perspective is the way felonies are handled. As mentioned
above, serious felonies such as rape or murder must be sent to Crown
Court if there is to be a trial and it will be, as mentioned above, a jury
trial. But there is a category of felonies, often referred to as "hybrid"
offenses or "either-way" offenses, such as theft, assault, and burglary,
which can be tried in either magistrates' court or Crown Court.10° The
defendant can insist on trial by jury in these either-way offenses, but not
many make that choice due to the limited sentencing authority pos-
sessed by magistrates or district judges which is six months in prison (or
one year for more than one charge) for such felonies. '
By having two trial models for misdemeanors and most felonies,
the pressure in charging or choosing a type of trial is strongly down-
ward. It is much to the advantage of the prosecuting service to charge a
crime low enough, if possible, to keep the case in magistrates' court.
Instead of a trial that would take a week in Crown Court, the trial can
take a couple of hours in magistrates' court.
108. Marshall, supra note 103.
109. See A.T.H. Smith, England and Wales in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE
EUROPEAN COmMuNITY, 73, 77 (Christine Van den Wyngaert ed., 1993).
110. See Kritzer, supra note 104, at 103-04.
111. Id. at 103.Of course, the defendant's choice does not always control where the case is
tried. If the particular burglary is a serious one or the defendant has a substantial criminal record
such that a sentence in excess of year would be required if there is a conviction, the magistrates
will send the case to Crown Court for trial even if the defendant would prefer trial in magistrates'
court.
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By contrast, in the United States, there is a single criminal trial
model for felonies and misdemeanors; it is always in the interest of
prosecutors to charge as high as ethically permitted to force defendants
to plead guilty in order to avoid a harsh sentence.
England is also an interesting contrast to the United States because
there are guidelines for plea bargaining that would seem to exclude the
sorts of extreme pressures put on defendants in the United States to
plead guilty. According to the guidelines put forward in 2007 by the
Sentencing Guidelines Council, a guilty plea should always result in
sentence that is lower than would otherwise be appropriate for the seri-
ousness of the crime in question."' The Guideline on plea bargaining
sets up a sliding scale of a one-third reduction if the defendant pleads
guilty at the first reasonable opportunity, a one-quarter reduction for a
guilty plea if the case had been set for trial, and a one-tenth reduction if
the guilty plea is entered only at the start or during the trial. 3
This summary is not intended to suggest that England's criminal
justice system does not have problems or that the U.S. should start ap-
pointing lay magistrates. It is simply intended to show (a) that the
Court's reliance on English legal history for support in requiring jury
trials for all felonies overlooks the long history of Magistrates' Courts
in the country and, more importantly, (b) that a country can construct a
system with two trial models for less serious felonies that provides ben-
efits for defendants as well as prosecutors if they opt for the simpler,
less expensive trial model.
III. PROVINCIAL COURTS AND SUPERIOR COURTS N CANADA
Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms, adopted in 1982, shows
a clear debt to the Bill of Rights in the U.S. Constitution in many of its
provisions. There is, for example, a right "not to be subjected to any
cruel and unusual treatment or punishment"'1 4 as well as a right "to be
secure against unreasonable search or seizure.""' 5 But when it comes to
trial rights of those charged with crimes, there seems to be a substantial
deviation from the Sixth Amendment. Indeed, the Charter gives defend-
ant the right "to the benefit of trial by jury where the maximum punish-
112. See Sentencing Guidelines Council, Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea (2007),
http://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/Reduction in Sentence for a GuiltyPlea -Revised 2007.pdf.
113. Id.at5-6.
114. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms §12 (1982).
115. Id. at §8
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ment for the offence is imprisonment for five years or a more severe
punishment."l
6
This limitation on the right to a jury trial to offenses threatening a
sentence in excess of five years seems harsh and one reading that provi-
sion might assume that there are many defendants charged with felonies
who cannot get jury trials before they are sent to prison for two, three or
even five years. That is not the case, however, because Canada, like
England, has two different courts for handling criminal trials.
Provincial courts handle all the minor offenses as well as vast ma-
jority of the less serious felonies. Offenses tried in the provincial courts
are always tried by a judge. Jury trials only take place in superior
courts, but, unlike England, defendants charged with serious offenses in
a superior court may opt for a nonjury trial. Therefore, both jury trials
and nonjury trials take place in superior courts.
The key distinction between provincial courts and superior courts
is the limited sentencing authority of judges in the provincial courts
compared to superior court judges. Judges in the provincial courts - for
most offenses - may only impose a sentence of imprisonment of six
months. There is a general statement in the Canadian Criminal Code
setting out this limit on sentences after a summary trial - meaning no
indictment and no jury trial. 7 Many minor crimes - for example, litter-
ing, prostitution, and public indecency - are set out by statute as sum-
mary offenses and they will be handled in a provincial court. These
summary offenses are roughly equivalent to misdemeanors in the Unit-
ed States."'
When it comes to more serious crimes, there are three types of
what Canada refers to as "indictable offenses." The least serious, such a
betting or book-making, must be tried in a provincial court, unless for
some extraordinary reason the judge decides otherwise."l9 At the other
end of the spectrum are a tiny number of very serious crimes that must
always be tried in a superior court including murder, treason, and pira-
cy.2° Finally, there is large category of indictable offenses that may be
tried in either a provincial court or a superior court. In some of these,
116. Id.at§1l(f).
117. Section 787 (1), Criminal Code of Canada states: "Unless otherwise provided by law,
everyone who is convicted of an offense punishable by summary conviction is liable to.. .a term
of imprisonment not exceeding six months."
118. See LORI HAUSEGGER, MATTHEw HENNIGAR & TROY RIDDELL, CANADIAN COURTS:
LAW, POLITICS, AND PROCESS at 35 (2009).
119. Id.at35-36.
120. See Martin's Criminal Code §469 (Edward L. Greenspan et al. eds., 2009).
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the choice is up to the prosecutor and many statutes provide quite dif-
ferent penalties if the conviction takes place in superior court as com-
pared to summary conviction for the same offense. '21 Thus, for example,
possession of drugs carries a penalty of up to seven years upon convic-
tion after indictment, but only six months for a summary conviction (or
up to one year if there was a previous conviction).'
There is also another category of middle level indictable offenses
where the choice of the forum for trial belongs to the defendant. These
are sometimes referred to as "hybrid" offenses that may be tried in ei-
ther a provincial court or a superior court at the option of the defendant.
One example is theft under $5,000.123
But these different categories of indictable offenses are not as im-
portant in practice in terms of the forum where they will be tried be-
cause there are strong incentives for both the prosecutor and the defend-
ant to opt for trial in a provincial court if possible. This is reflected in
the fact that only a tiny percentage of criminal cases - approximately
2% - are tried in superior court.124 One reason for this is the fact that
very serious crimes like murder or treason are not common. But, of
more importance, is the fact that both prosecutors and defendants bene-
fit from a trial in a provincial court.
For prosecutors they get a much shorter trial because it is not a ju-
ry trial. It is the same evidence as would be presented to a jury, but it
goes much more quickly to a professional judge.
Defendants also benefit from trials in provincial courts. Clearly,
the big advantage is the limited sentencing authority of provincial court
judges. Defendants are assured of a rather lenient sentence after trial in
a provincial court compared to what they might receive in a superior
court. In addition, the criminal matter will usually be resolved much
more quickly in provincial court.
There are other important benefits for defendants when the trial
takes place in provincial court. Defendants who have a summary con-
viction are often spared the collateral consequences as far as deporta-
tion, extradition, and immigration that would ensue after conviction in a
121. See Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, Martin's Criminal Code §6(b)(i) (Edward L.
Greenspan et al. eds., 2009).
122. See id. at §4(3).
123. See HAUSEGGER,supra note 118 at 36.
124. See Cheryl Marie Webster & Anthony N. Doob, Superior Courts in the Twenty-first
Century: An Historical Anachronism?, in CANADA'S TRIAL COURTS 57, 62 (Peter H. Russell, ed.
2007).
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superior court.25
Additionally, those convicted of a summary offense may apply for
a suspension of their criminal record after five years if they have not
committed another crime in the period after conviction. 126 This does not
expunge the criminal record, but it takes their conviction out of the gen-
eral database of criminal convictions, which will permit them to apply
for employment or other benefits that would be foreclosed with a crimi-
nal record.27 In contrast, a person convicted of an indictable offense
must wait ten years to apply for a suspension of record. 
28
Obviously, the government wants cases handled in provincial
courts if possible, and the sentencing authority has been raised for cer-
tain crimes to try to keep those crimes in provincial court. Thus, while
the sentencing authority of provincial court judges is six months for
most offenses, as mentioned above, this limit has been raised to eight-
een months for some more serious, high volume crimes, including as-
sault with a weapon, uttering a threat to cause death or bodily harm,
causing bodily harm, and sexual assault.129 What Canada wanted to ac-
complish by increasing the sentencing authority of provincial judges for
these crimes, many of which would seem to require a sentence in excess
of six months, is to convince prosecutors to try those crimes in a pro-
vincial court if possible.
The limit on sentences that may be imposed by provincial courts
for particular crimes serves as both a reference point and an anchor to
keep sentences after jury trials in proportion to those modest sentencing
limits.
In that regard, note must be taken of the low incarceration rate in
Canada compared to the United States. While Canadian crime rates
generally track those in the United States,'3" Canada incarcerates only
125. See Section 36 (1)(a), Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001, http://laws-
lois.justice.gc.caleng/acts/I-2.5/. For example, a permanent resident in Canada will not be re-
quired to leave unless convicted of a crime with a possible sentence in excess of ten years or hav-
ing been given a sentence in excess of six months.
126. See Parole Board of Canada, Record Suspension Guide 1 (2014), http://pbc-
clcc.gc.ca/prdons/pardoninstr-eng.pdf.
127. Id. at2.
128. Id. at 1.
129. See Section 469, Martin Criminal Code, 2009.
130. Canadian researchers eport that Canada has a crime culture that has been similar to the
United States over the last forty years and its crime rates track the rise and fall of those rates in
the United States over the same period. See Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Coun-
tering Punitiveness: Understanding Stability in Canada's Imprisonment Rate, 40 LAW & SOC.
REv. 325, 326-28 (2006).
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about 120 citizens per 100,000 and has done so for decades.131 This is a
rate roughly one-sixth that of the United States rate. We cannot say that
the two-trial model achieves that stability in the incarceration rate, but
certainly it contributes to that stability as there is less need for the sorts
of plea bargaining cudgels that are used often in the United States to
force defendants to waive their right to trial and plead guilty.
While plea bargaining is not subject to the sort of fixed sentence
reduction discount one sees in England, it is reported that approximately
80 to 90 percent of cases end in a plea agreement.13 2 This would seem
consistent with the plea bargaining rate in the United States thirty or
forty years ago, but not today where the plea bargaining rate is much
higher.
This brief summary of Canada's trial system is obviously incom-
plete. There are other factors not discussed here that also contribute to
Canada's low incarceration rate when compared to the United States,
such as the fact that Canada has a national criminal code, that prosecu-
tors and judges are not elected, and that there is a Department of Justice
Ministry that plays a central role in drafting and evaluating legislation.
But the point of this comparison is to show that by having a second
simpler trial model in addition to the jury trial model and making it to
advantageous for prosecutors and defendants to opt for a nonjury trial,
there is not the same need to force plea bargains on defendants as hap-
pens in the United States. In turn, the use of the nonjury trial model
helps keep sentences lower.
IV. CONCLUSION
The sweeping commitment to jury trials in Duncan and Baldwin
has proven to be a classic instance of the law of unintended conse-
quences. Instead of providing defendants more protection against the
power of the government, defendants are less protected today. Lacking
a trial model that can be used for a large number of criminal cases, the
system avoids trials by putting tremendous pressure to plead guilty.
The ease with which cases can be run through our court system, in turn,
marks far too many citizens as criminals and turns imprisonment from
an occasional deterrent to be imposed selectively into an expectation or
a rite of passage for many young men, especially those in minority
131. See Cheryl Marie Webster & Anthony N. Doob, Punitive Trends and Stable Imprison-
ment Rates in Canada, 36 LAW & Soc. REv. 297, 311 (2007).
132. See HAUSEGGER, supra note 118, at 290.
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communities.
Duncan and Baldwin end up undercutting other constitutional pro-
tections. There was a time when the warnings required by Miranda v.
Arizona were viewed as an important protection as arrestees faced po-
lice questioning at the stationhouse"' But, today, what happens in the
stationhouse is often only marginally relevant to what will happen in the
courthouse. Whether the defendant made admissions or not in the inter-
rogation room, the real pressure to admit one's crime, as Kudu shows,
will take place in open court in front of judges and defense lawyers
when defendants are threatened with sentences greatly in excess of what
they deserve if they do not plead guilty.
There are many who blame the failures and injustices in our sys-
tem on prosecutors who overcharge, on judges who have ceded sentenc-
ing authority to prosecutors, and on legislators who pass brutal manda-
tory sentences. This article is not meant to absolve actors in the system
for blame, but rather to show that our trial system gives them no help in
doing the right thing.
Substantial reform requires that we deal with the gorilla in the
room - our insistence that jury trials are indispensable in the United
States for all those charged with misdemeanors and felonies. We need
to accept that there can be fair trials that do not use juries. If we look
around, we see countries that do not use juries or use them sparingly. 1
3 4
We also see international tribunals dealing with crimes of the greatest
magnitude that do not use juries.
What England and Canada show is that you can build a system that
permits many defendants to put forward a defense or an explanation for
what they did without adding enormous expenses to the system. At the
same time, a simpler, more efficient trial system, if built the right way,
133. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
134. See A.H.J. Swart, The Netherlands in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 279, 288 (Christine Van Den Wyngaert, ed. 1993). Most European
countries do not use juries but may use lay persons sitting along with professional judges, but
some countries, such as the Netherlands, do not use lay persons at all in their criminal justice sys-
tem.
Those who followed the murder trial of South African athlete Oscar Pistorius will have noticed
that the trial was not to a jury, but to a judge. See Alyssa Newcomb & Liezl Thom, Oscar Pisto-
rius Verdict in Hands of One Judge, Not a Jury, ABC NEWS, (Mar. 4, 2014),
http://abcnews.go.com/Intemational/oscar-pistorius-verdict-hands-one-judge-not-
jury/story?id=22769674. In drafting the South African constitution, adopted in 1996, the docu-
ment includes educational, environmental, and health care rights, but jury trials were not included
in the protections given defendants. South Africa, of course, was emerging from apartheid and it
is also a complex country with seven official languages in its constitution.
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can push down on charging and sentencing.
One U.S. city has tried to accomplish something similar to what
occurs in England or Canada by informally encouraging defendants to
opt for nonjury trials. Philadelphia has more trials and less plea bargain-
ing by assigning those judges who tend to sentence leniently to handle
nonjury trial dockets and those judges who tend to be severe in sentenc-
ing to jury trial dockets.'35
But it is unlikely other jurisdictions will follow this lead until such
time as the Court encourages reform. In Duncan, the Court indicated in
a footnote that it is certainly conceivable that a state might have "[a]
criminal process that was fair and equitable but used no juries."' 3 6 Such
a process, the Court went on, "would make use of alternative guarantees
and protections."'37 "Yet," the Court said, "no American State has un-
dertaken to construct such a system.',
38
No state will construct such a system until the Court encourages
alternatives to the full jury-trial model for less serious crimes. Unfortu-
nately, our present system works extremely well for the institutional
players. But it does not work well for defendants. Fewer defendants get
a chance to be heard and those that insist on that right sometimes pay a
terrible price if they are convicted.
135. See generally, Stephen J. Schulhofer, 'Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1037 (1984). Professor Stephen Schulhofer offered the Philadelphia practice as a way of limiting
the need for plea-bargaining. He evaluated the nonjury trials that took place and found them to be
adversarial trials with acquittal rates similar to the jury trial rate.
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